– Paper summary at CEGA, University of California
– Project Brief at IGC
– Coverage in The Guardian
– Blog post at IDEAS

Abstract: This paper provides evidence that the personalities of policymakers matter for policy. Three results support the relevance of personalities for policy. First, doctors with higher Big Five and Perry Public Sector Motivation scores attend work more and falsify inspection reports less. Second, health inspectors who score higher on these measures exhibit larger treatment responses to increased monitoring. Last, senior health officials with higher personality scores respond more to data on staff absence by compelling better subsequent attendance. These results suggest that interpersonal differences matter are consequential for state performance.

– Political Science Now summary of article

Abstract: Recruiting a large number of ground workers is crucial for running effective modern election campaigns. It is unclear if party leaders can shape the quality and quantity of the unpaid rank-and-file workforce as they can with prized nominations for candidates. We analyze a field experiment conducted by an Indian party that randomized recruitment messages reaching 1% of a 13-million-person electorate to join its rank-and-file. Contrary to concerns that parties can only attract a few poor-quality volunteers, we show that elite efforts can shape the rank-and-file. In fact, specific strategies can increase the size, enhance the gender and ethnic diversity, and broaden the education and political skills of recruits. Strategies that signal gender inclusiveness have a lasting impact on some dimensions up to three years later. Taken together, this paper provides the first causal evidence that rank-and-file recruitment is an opportunity for elites to shape long-term party development.

Abstract: How can we motivate good politicians – those that will carry out policy that is responsive to citizens’ preferences – to enter politics? In a field experiment in Pakistan, we vary how political office is portrayed to ordinary citizens. Emphasizing prosocial motives for holding political office instead of personal returns – such as the ability to help others versus enhancing one’s own respect and status – raises the likelihood that individuals run for office and that voters elect them. A year later, the treatment improves the alignment of policy with citizens’ preferences. These effects emerge only when treatments are randomly delivered in a public setting. Taken together, the results demonstrate that how politics is perceived shapes who decides to run for office, who is elected, as well the policies that democracies deliver.

• Listen to an AI podcast on the paper
• Commentary in Nature News & Views
• Coverage in Nature Editorial
• Coverage in Vox

Abstract: Air pollution in South Asia is one of the largest health emergencies on the planet, responsible for two million deaths every year. Crop residue burning accounts for 40-60% of peak pollution during the winter harvest months. Despite being illegal, this practice remains widespread. Any solution to curb the problem necessitates government action at scale. We study whether leveraging the incentives of bureaucrats tasked with controlling burning can mitigate this phenomenon. Using a decade of wind, fire, and health data from satellites and DHS surveys, we show that crop burning responds to bureaucrats’ incentives: fires increase by 15% when wind is most likely to direct pollution to neighboring jurisdictions and decreases by 14.5% when it pollutes their own. These effects intensify with stronger bureaucratic incentives and capacity. We also find that bureaucrat action against burning deters future polluters, further reducing fires by 13%. Finally, using an atmospheric model, we estimate that a 1 log increase in in-utero exposure to pollution from burning increases child mortality by 30-36 deaths per 1,000 births, underscoring the importance of bureaucrat action. Contrary to growing beliefs that the problem of crop burning is intractable, these findings highlight specific ways in which existing bureaucrats, when properly incentivized, can improve environmental management and public health outcomes.

Abstract: We report results of a forecasting experiment about a randomized controlled trial that was conducted in the field. The experiment asks Ph.D. students, faculty, and policy practitioners to forecast (1) compliance rates for the RCT and (2) treatment effects of the intervention. The forecasting experiment randomizes the order of questions about compliance and treatment effects and the provision of information that a pilot experiment had been conducted which produced null results. Forecasters were excessively optimistic about treatment effects and unresponsive to item order as well as to information about a pilot. Those who declare themselves expert in the area relevant to the intervention are particularly resistant to new information that the treatment is ineffective. We interpret our results as suggesting that we should exercise caution when undertaking expert forecasting, since experts may have unrealistic expectations and may be inflexible in altering these even when provided new information.

Abstract: Why do modern states allow parts of their territory to be governed by non-state actors? We explore this using the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) in Pakistan, a British Colonial law only abrogated in 2018, which left governance to pre-colonial tribal councils in large parts of modern day Pakistan. In areas where the FCR did not apply, the British and Pakistani state built modern political and bureaucratic institutions. Using primary legal documents, we build a dataset of when and where FCR applied between 1901 and 2012. The territorial extent of the formal state is both cleanly demarcated by this law and varies substantially over time, permitting an empirical examination of the determinants of state control. The data reveal that the Green Revolution’s potential to transform agriculture played a major role in extending the formal state. The law was repealed from areas where agricultural productivity stood to benefit the most from the Green Revolution during 1960s. This is consistent with a model where technological changes that shift the returns to control influence where states choose to govern.

– Winner of the Inaugural Rajni Kothari Best Article Prize best article on the politics of South Asia
– Winner of the Paul A. Sabatier Best Award for best conference paper on Science, Technology, & Environmental Politics
– Coverage in DownToEarth
– Coverage in The Hindu
– Presentation at CEGA Evidence2Action Summit
– Presentation at Asoka University, TCDP

Abstract: How does political representation affect conservation? We argue that the mixed evidence in the literature may be driven by institutional arrangements that provide authority to marginalized communities, but do not make adequate arrangements to truly boost their voice in resource management. We study a 1996 law that created local government councils with mandated representation for India’s Scheduled Tribes, a community of 100 million. Using difference-in-differences designs, we find that the dramatic increase in ST representation led to a substantial increase in tree cover and a reduction in deforestation. We present suggestive evidence that representation enabled marginalized communities to better pursue their interests, which, unlike commercial operations such as mining, are compatible with forest conservation. While conservation policy tends to stress environmentally-focused institutions, we suggest more attention be given to umbrella institutions, such as political representation, which can address conservation and development for marginalized communities in tandem.

– Blog post on the paper at Vox EU
– Paper Summary at JPAL

Abstract: The paper examines how politics relates to public sector absenteeism, a chronic and intractable public service delivery problem in many developing countries. In Punjab, Pakistan, we document that political interference routinely protects doctors from sanction in the health bureaucracy, while personal connections between doctors and politicians and a lack of political competition are associated with more doctor absence. We then examine how politics impacts the success of an at-scale policy reform to combat absenteeism. We find that the reform was more effective at increasing doctor atten- dance in politically competitive constituencies, both through increased monitoring and through senior health officials more effectively responding to data on poor performing health facilities. Our results demonstrate that politics can block the success of reform; instead of lifting the poor performers up, the reform improved places that were already performing better than others. The evidence collectively points to the fundamental importance of accounting for political incentives for policy design and implementation.

– Summary at AJPS
– Winner of AJPS Best Paper award

Abstract: Over 40% of countries around the world have adopted limits on campaign contributions to curb the influence of money in politics. Yet, we have limited knowledge of whether and how these limits achieve this goal. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits institutional rules on contribution limits in Colombian municipalities, we show that looser limits increase the number of public contracts assigned to donors to the elected candidate. This is explained by looser limits increasing the influence of top donors over the elected candidate, rather than reducing electoral competition or changing who is elected to office. We further show that looser limits worsen the quality of public contracts given to the winner’s donors: These contracts are more likely to run over their stipulated costs. Overall, this article links looser campaign contribution limits, donor kickbacks, and worse performance of contracts awarded to donors.

Abstract: An established finding on ballot design is that prominent positions on the ballot improves the electoral performance of parties or candidates because voters respond behaviorally to salient information. This paper presents evidence on an additional unexplored mechanism: campaigns, who act before voters, adjust their behavior when allocated a salient position on the ballot. We use a constituency-level lottery of ballot positions in Colombia and first establish that a ballot-order effect exists: campaigns randomly placed at the top earn more votes and seat shares. Second, we show that campaigns react to being placed on top of the ballot: they raise and spend more money on their campaign and spending is correlated with higher vote shares. In addition to presenting evidence for how campaigns react strategically to election administration, our results provide the first evidence for a new mechanism for the ballot-order effects examined in many previous studies.

– Winner of the Lawrence Longley Award for best article published in previous year on representation & electoral systems, 2021
– Oxford CSAE seminar presentation (youtube)
– Video blog and short summary at Ideas for India

Abstract: Does political affirmative action undermine or promote development? We present the first systematic analysis of Scheduled Areas in India, home to 100 million, where local political office is reserved for the historically disadvantaged Scheduled Tribes. A newly constructed dataset of 217,000 villages allows us to probe conflicting hypotheses on the implementation of the world’s largest workfare program, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. We find that reservations deliver no worse overall outcomes, that there are large gains for targeted minorities, and that these gains come at the cost of the relatively privileged, not other minorities. We also find improvements in other pro-poor programs, including a rural roads program and general public goods. Reservations more closely align benefits to each group’s population share, allaying concerns of overcompensation for inequalities. Contrary to the expectations of skeptics, results indicate that affirmative action can redistribute both political and economic power without hindering overall development.

–Coverage in The Economist
–Featured Story on the World Bank website
–Coverage on World Bank’s Governance for Development Blog
– Project Summary at International Growth Center
–Coverage in Herald Magazine
– Best Paper Award at NYU Graduate Political Economy Conference, 2013

Abstract: We evaluate a program in Pakistan that equips government health inspectors with a smartphone app which channels data on rural clinics to senior policy makers. The system led to rural clinics being inspected 104% more often after 6 months, but only 43.8% more often after a year, with the latter estimate not attaining significance at conventional levels. There is also no clear evidence that the increase in inspections led to increases in general staff attendance. In addition, we test whether senior officials act on the information provided by the system. Focusing only on districts where the app is deployed, we find that highlighting poorly performing facilities on a dashboard viewed by supervisors raises doctor attendance by 75%. Our results indicate that technology may be able to mobilize data to useful effect, even in low capacity settings.

– Best Paper Award at George Mason University Graduate Conference, 2014

Abstract: Research on the benefits of political alignment suggests that voters who elect governing party politicians are better off than those who elect other politicians. We examine this claim with regression discontinuity designs that isolate the effect of electing a governing party politician on an important publicly provided service in Pakistan: health. Consistent with existing research, governing party constituents receive a higher quantity of services: more doctors are assigned to work in governing party areas. However, despite many more assigned doctors, there is no increase in doctor attendance. These findings contrast with the literature on political alignment by showing that alignment to the governing party affects voters’ welfare ambiguously: higher potential quantity of services may come at the cost of lower quality. 

Abstract: We identify Pakistani men’s willingness to pay to preserve their anti-American identity using two experiments imposing clearly-specified financial costs on anti-American expression, with minimal consequential or social considerations. In two distinct studies, one-quarter to one-third of subjects forgo payments from the U.S. government worth around one-fifth of a day’s wage to avoid an identity-threatening choice: anonymouslychecking a box indicating gratitude toward the U.S. government. We find sensitivity to both payment size and anticipated social context: when subjects anticipate that rejection will be observable by others, rejection falls suggesting that, for some, social image can outweigh self-image. 

– “Too many politicians spoiling the babu’s broth” Blogpost in Mint
– “When does politics work for development?” Blogpost on the paper in Ideas for India
– Inaugural Best Paper Award by the Quality of Government Institute at Gothenburg University, 2017
– Best Paper Award at UCLA Graduate Conference in Comparative Politics, 2015

Abstract: When do politicians prompt bureaucrats to provide effective services? Leveraging the uneven overlap of jurisdictions in India, we compare bureaucrats supervised by a single political principal with those supervised by multiple politicians. With an original dataset of nearly half a million villages, we find that implementation of India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, the largest employment program in the world, is substantially better where bureaucrats answer to a single politician. Regression discontinuity estimates help increase confidence that this result is causal. Our findings suggest that politicians face strong incentives to motivate bureaucrats as long as they internalize the benefits from doing so. In contrast to a large literature on the deleterious effects of political interventions, our results show that political influence may be more favorable to development than is commonly assumed.